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MARSHALL AND BERNARD : 
IGNORING THE RELEVANCE OF 
CUSTOMARY PROPERTY LAWS
Nigel Bankes*
This brief comment on the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. 
Marshall; R. v. Bernard1 focuses on that part o f the judgment dealing with aboriginal 
title. I argue that the majority opinion is seriously flawed insofar as it undermines the 
significance of aboriginal laws as a way of proving the existence of an aboriginal title. 
By doing so the judgment fails to give adequate weight to the aboriginal perspective on 
the source and nature of aboriginal title, thereby compromising the reconciliation project 
that lies at the heart of the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence on s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. I begin with some observations on teaching aboriginal title and 
then turn to examine how the majority opinion comprehensively undermines the 
significance of aboriginal customary laws. I examine the way in which the court 
describes and applies the “aboriginal perspective” on title while ignoring or at least 
downplaying the view that aboriginal title is sui generis.
Teaching the doctrine of aboriginal title
When John Borrows and Leonard Rotman produced their first edition of Aboriginal 
Legal Issues, Cases, Materials and Commentary2 a few years ago I adopted it as the text 
for a course I teach on aboriginal law.3 But unlike the authors, who begin their book 
with the topic of Aboriginal Title, I start the course with the subject matter of Chapter 6, 
“Governance” (re-framed in my course in terms of self-determination and self- 
government). I also supplement Borrows and Rotman’s treatment of governance with
* Professor o f  Law, University o f Calgary. Thanks to my colleague Professor Watson Hamilton for several 
useful discussions o f  the Marshall and Bernard decision and for her penetrating comments on a draft o f  this 
paper. I completed this comment in January 2006 while visiting at the Faculty o f  Law at the University o f  
Copenhagen; I thank the Faculty there, and especially Anita Ronne, for their hospitality.
1 2005 SCC 43 [Marshall and Bernard],
2 Butterworths, 1998. Now in its second edition (Toronto: Lexis-Nexis Butterworths, 2003) but still organized 
in the same manner with aboriginal title at the beginning and “governance” two thirds o f  the way through the 
book.
3 Like most such courses in Canadian law schools, the course focuses on the application o f  settler law to 
indigenous peoples; it is not a course on the laws o f  indigenous societies.
the Opening Statement of Counsel in the Delgamuukw case4 as well as with some 
international legal materials dealing with the right of self-determination. I start the 
course this way because I want to emphasise for the students that an aboriginal title 
cannot exist in the abstract but needs to be seen as part and parcel of an overall 
indigenous legal system, a system of legal relationships between people, and between 
people, land, resources and territory. Aboriginal title is then, a subset, a necessary 
implication, of the self-governing status of indigenous peoples prior to the acquisition of 
sovereignty by the Crown. Justice Judson recognized this in Calder in referring to the 
Indians as being there, “organized in societies and occupying the lands as their 
forefathers had done.”5
Framing the issue in this way helps locate the body of aboriginal law and the 
doctrine of aboriginal title firmly within the framework of human rights law and the law 
of self determination of all peoples.6 The statement of counsel in Delgamuukw serves 
similar purposes, drawing attention to the problem of forum and the hegemonic nature of 
legal discourse. Why must the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en sue in Her Majesty’s courts? 
Why is the onus on the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en to prove their title and not on the 
Crown to prove its title? What fora, if any, exist for resolving inter-societal disputes? 
But framing the issue this way also helps to make the point that how we conceptualize 
aboriginal title affects how plaintiffs seek to prove the existence of an aboriginal title. 
Counsel may lead evidence of actual physical possession or control; additionally counsel 
may assert, as they did in memorable terms in Delgamuukw, that they assume the 
unenviable task of leading evidence in Her Majesty’s Courts to prove the existence of a 
civilization. As part of that challenge, counsel will lead evidence of the existence of a 
legal system including a system of property laws.
In its judgment in Delgamuukw,7 the Supreme Court recognized these two ways 
of proving title and accepted that they might operate conjunctively and cumulatively 
rather than as mutually exclusive alternatives. I refer here to those well known passages 
of Chief Justice Lamer’s opinion dealing with “the test for the proof of aboriginal title.”8 
In these passages the Chief Justice concluded that one of the implications of having to 
take account of the aboriginal perspective is that the Court cannot look only to the
4 Reproduced in [1988] 1 C.N.L.R. 14, “Gitksan-Wet’suwet’en Land Title Action”.
5 Calder v. Attorney General o f  British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313 at 328.
6 This is not say that the language o f  property and title cannot be framed in human rights terms, as was so ably 
demonstrated by the decision o f the Inter American Court o f  Human Rights in Case o f  the Mayagna (Sumo) 
Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua, Judgment o f  August 31,2001, Series C, No. 79. However, as Canada 
has chosen not to include explicit constitutional recognition o f the right to property, claims to title are not so 
readily recognizable as human rights claims as is the basic claim to self-determination.
1 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [Delgamuukw].
8 Ibid. at paras. 147-48. These passages contain some o f the very few reference in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence to the laws o f Aboriginal peoples. More often, and the majority judgment in Marshall and 
Bernard as I discuss below is certainly a case in point, the Court prefers language that is less normatively 
explicit e.g. customs, practices or perspectives.
common law’s emphasis on physical occupation as proof of possession which in turn 
may ground title,9 but the Court must also have regard to aboriginal laws in relation to 
land:
the source of aboriginal title appears to be grounded both in the 
common law and in the aboriginal perspective on land; the latter 
includes, but is not limited to, their systems of law. It follows that 
both should be taken into account in establishing the proof of 
occupancy. Indeed, there is precedent for doing so. In Baker Lake ...
Mahoney J. held that to prove aboriginal title, the claimants needed 
both to demonstrate their “physical presence on the land they 
occupied” (at p. 561) and the existence “among [that group of ] ... a 
recognition of the claimed rights ... by the regime that prevailed 
before” (at p. 559).
This approach to the proof of occupancy at common law is also 
mandated in the context of s. 35(1) by Van derPeet. In that decision 
... I held ... that the reconciliation of the prior occupation of North 
America by aboriginal peoples with the assertion of Crown 
sovereignty required that account be taken of the “aboriginal 
perspective while at the same time taking into account the perspective 
of the common law” and that “[t]rue reconciliation will, equally, 
place weight on each”. I also held that the aboriginal perspective on 
the occupation of their lands can be gleaned, in part, but not 
exclusively, from their traditional laws, because those laws were 
elements of the practices, customs and traditions of aboriginal 
peoples ... As a result, if, at the time o f sovereignty, an aboriginal 
society had laws in relation to land, those laws would be relevant to 
establishing the occupation o f lands which are the subject o f a claim 
for aboriginal title. Relevant laws might include, but are not limited 
to, a land tenure system or laws governing land use. (emphasis 
added)10
In my course, I also supplement the second edition of Borrows and Rotman 
with extracts from the High Court of Australia’s decision in Mabo v. Queensland (No. 
2).u I want Canadian students to read Mabo, and especially extracts from Justice 
Brennan’s opinion, for several reasons. First, I want students to reflect on the 
relationship between domestic law and international law and the role that international
9 Ibid. at para. 149 and referring to Kent McNeil, “The Meaning o f  Aboriginal Title” in Michael Asch ed., 
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality and Respect fo r  Difference (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 1997) at 135-54.
10 Ibid. at paras. 147-48.
11 Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) (1991-1992), 175 C.L.R. 1, included in the first edition but omitted from the 
second.
human rights law plays in having us re-frame questions of domestic aboriginal law.12 
Second, I want students to read Justice Brennan’s judicial trashing (with the aid of the 
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Western Sahara case13) of 
the racist doctrine of res nullius and the related concept of acquiring title non- 
derivatively by peaceful settlement. And third, I want students to read those passages of 
Brennan’s judgment in which he suggests that the source and content of aboriginal title 
is founded in the laws and customs of the aboriginal people concerned.
Native title has its origin in and is given its content by the traditional 
laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the 
indigenous inhabitants of a territory. The nature and incidents of 
native title must be ascertained as a matter of fact by reference to 
those laws and customs.14
... once it is acknowledged that an inhabited territory which became a 
settled colony was no more a legal desert than it was “desert 
uninhabited” in fact, it is necessary to ascertain by evidence the 
nature and incidents of native title. Though these are matters of fact, 
some general propositions about native title can be stated without 
reference to evidence.15
Native title, though recognized by the common law, is not an 
institution of the common law...16
Australian law can protect the interests of members of an indigenous 
clan or group, whether communally or individually, only in 
conformity with the traditional laws and customs of the people to 
whom the clan or group belongs and only where members of the clan 
or group acknowledge those laws and observe those customs (so far 
as it is practicable to do so). Once traditional native title expires, the 
Crown's radical title expands to a full beneficial title, for then there is 
no other proprietor than the Crown.17
12 This provides an opportunity to discuss Mabo v. Queensland (No. 1) (1988), 166 C.L.R. 186 and the 
Australian implementing legislation for the Convention on the Elimination o f  All Forms o f  Racial 
Discrimination.
13 [1975] I.C.J.R. 12.
14 Ibid. at para. 64. This passage was referred to with approval by Chief Justice Lamer in R. v. Van der Peet, 
[1996] 2 SCR 507 at para. 40.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid. at para. 65.
17 Ibid. at para. 66.
Native title to particular land (whether classified by the common law 
as proprietary, usufructuary or otherwise), its incidents and the 
persons entitled thereto are ascertained according to the laws and 
customs of the indigenous people who, by those laws and customs, 
have a connection with the land. It is immaterial that the laws and 
customs have undergone some change since the Crown acquired 
sovereignty provided the general nature of the connection between 
the indigenous people and the land remains.18
Now I realize that it is possible to criticise this “aboriginal laws approach” (and 
here I think of Kent McNeil’s excellent work19) if it forms the sole measure of the source 
and content of title on the grounds that such an approach may diminish the content of an 
aboriginal title once established. It might, for example, make it very difficult for an 
aboriginal plaintiff to establish title to petroleum unless it could establish the existence 
of customary laws in relation to that substance. Indeed it seems fairly clear that the 
Supreme Court in Delgamuukw recognized this problem and suggested that it was 
possible to rely, as we have seen in the quotations above, on both aboriginal laws and 
the physical fact of prior possession for the source, proof and content of aboriginal 
title.20 Indeed, the court developed a fairly thick concept of aboriginal title in 
Delgamuukw subject only to the paternalistic doctrine of inherent limits on the use of 
that title.
But what does all of this have to do with the Supreme Court’s judgment in 
Marshall and Bernard? In this short comment I argue that the majority judgment in 
Marshall and Bernard comprehensively denies the significance of the customary laws of 
indigenous peoples and renders them virtually irrelevant in proving the existence of an 
aboriginal title. As such the decision is inconsistent with the Court’s earlier decision in 
Delgamuukw. By ignoring or downplaying the significance of indigenous legal systems, 
the judgment undermines the fundamental goal of reconciliation and calls into question 
the conceptual underpinnings of aboriginal title in Canadian law. By emphasising the 
facts of possession rather than the recognition of a pre-existing system of laws, the 
judgment decontextualizes and trivializes the concept of aboriginal title. Finally, the 
judgment raises the spectre, hinted at in the separate concurring opinion of Justice 
LeBel, that the Court has revived a version of the terra nullius doctrine.21 In support of
18 Ibid. at para. 83, # 6.
19 See in particular McNeil, supra note 9; Kent M cNeil,“The Post -Delgamuukw Nature and Content o f  
Aboriginal Title” in Emerging Justice: Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: 
Native Law Centre, 2001) at 102-35. M cNeil’s comments on the position o f the Australian High Court, “The 
Relevance o f Traditional Laws and Customs to the Existence and Content ofNative Title at Common Law” 
are reproduced in the same volume at 416-63. I have examined this question at some length, relying 
extensively on McNeil, in “Aboriginal Title to Petroleum: Some Comparative Observations on the Law o f  
Canada, Australia and the United States” (2004) 7 Yearbook o f New Zealand Jurisprudence 111.
20 And certainly it seems fairly clear that the content o f  aboriginal customary laws does not control the 
content o f  aboriginal title in Canada. See especially Delgamuukw at paras. 118 et seq.
21 Marshall and Bernard, supra note 1 at paras. 127 and 134.
these claims, I examine the language that Chief Justice McLachlin uses to describe the 
normative ordering of indigenous societies, and I then examine how the Chief Justice 
actually uses “the aboriginal perspective” in assessing whether the Mi’kmaq are able to 
establish an aboriginal title based on the watershed approach endorsed by the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal in Bernard. The section concludes with some observations 
on the consistency of the judgment with the sui generis principle which, until now, 
seemed to be an important and central part of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 
aboriginal title.
Language
The language used by Chief Justice McLachlin to describe the “perspective” of 
indigenous societies seems deliberately designed to deny the normative significance of 
that perspective. By contrast the perspective of settler society is consistently and 
exclusively framed in terms of law and legal system. In general the majority judgment 
refuses to use the term “law” in the context of indigenous societies, preferring instead to 
use language that is either not normally associated with norms or which carries the 
connotation of soft norms rather than hard norms. For example, while acknowledging 
the need to take account of the views of both indigenous and settler society in resolving 
questions of aboriginal title, the majority judgment refers, in the case of settler society, 
to the “perspective of the common law”22 while the similar references to indigenous 
society adopt the language of “aboriginal perspective”23 or “aboriginal practice”,24 “pre­
sovereignty practice”, “aboriginal culture”25 or even uses.26 The implication is clear 
that, while such practices may be “facts”, they have no normative significance save what 
the common law chooses to accord them.
Other aspects of the contrasting treatment of the aboriginal versus settler 
perspective serve to devalue the significance of the indigenous legal system. For 
example, while the common law is described as a “complicated matrix of legal edicts 
and conventions” that has evolved over centuries, “the search for aboriginal title... takes 
us back to the beginnings of the notion of title.”27 The implication here is that the 
aboriginal legal system is primitive and cannot evolve. Similarly, the common law is
22 Ibid. at paras. 45-47. In some cases the judgment refers to the common law and in other cases European 
common law. What is this “European common law” o f  which she speaks? And how does it differ from the 
“European template” which McLachlin expressly states at para. 49 that she is not applying to resolve the 
question o f  title?
23 Ibid. at paras. 46 and 47.
24 Ibid. at para. 48. And see in particular at paras. 53 and 54 that “aboriginalpractices correspond to different 
modem rights” and that one o f  these modem rights, “aboriginal title ... is established by aboriginal practices 
that indicate possession similar to that associated with title at common law.”
25 Ibid. at para. 61.
26 Ibid. at para. 38 where the court suggests that some uses (e.g. hunting and fishing) accord rights.
27 Ibid. at para. 61. Whose notion o f title is this? That o f  the common law?
described as “modem” while aboriginal practice is described as “ancient”,28 and finally, 
recognition of the aboriginal perspective requires “sensitivity” while recognition of the 
perspective of settler society requires “fidelity to the common law concepts involved.”29 
These fairly crude dualisms call into question McLachlin’s claim (at para. 68) that the 
court has successfully resisted making “facile assumptions based on Eurocentric 
traditions of gathering and passing on historical facts.”30
This overall approach in the majority opinion was clearly of concern to Justices 
LeBel and Fish. In their separate concurring opinion, written by Justice LeBel, they 
argued that the Court must give greater weight to “aboriginal conceptions of 
territoriality, land-use and property” than to common law concepts as “otherwise, we 
might be implicitly accepting the position that aboriginal peoples had no rights in land 
prior to the assertion of Crown sovereignty because their views of property or land use 
do not fit with Euro-centric conceptions of property rights.”31 Consequently, Justice 
LeBel treated the normative ordering of the two societies, settler and indigenous, more 
even-handedly32 than did the majority, and recognized the importance of aboriginal 
customary laws:
Aboriginal title has been recognized by the common law and is in 
part defined by the common law, but it is grounded in aboriginal 
customary laws relating to land. The interest is proprietary in nature 
and is derived from inter-traditional notions of ownership ....33
Taking account of the aboriginal perspective but ignoring the role of indigenous 
laws
Having shown that the majority opinion diminishes the significance of indigenous laws 
by the language it uses to describe the normative ordering of indigenous societies, what 
role does the majority opinion foresee for the “aboriginal perspective”? Given the 
emphasis in the jurisprudence post- Van der Pee?4 on reconciliation as the purpose for 
s. 35, requiring courts to take account of the perspectives of both aboriginal and settler 
society, the majority in Marshall and Bernard could hardly ignore the minority’s charge. 
And indeed it does not do so and on several occasions reiterates the significance of the 
aboriginal perspective. But the key question for our purposes is what did the majority 
mean by this; what work do they expect the aboriginal perspective to do?
28 Ibid. at para. 77. And see also para. 53 where aboriginal practices are contrasted with modem rights.
29 Ibid. at para. 70.
30 Ibid. at para. 68.
31 Ibid. at para. 127.
32 See especially Ibid. at para. 139 where Lebel notes that “The aboriginal perspective on the occupation o f  
their land can also be gleaned in part, but not exclusively, from pre-sovereignty systems o f aboriginal law.”
33 Ibid. at para. 128.
34 R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at para. 31. Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry o f  
Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 [Haida Nation].
My claim here is that while the court recites the relevant approach it pays little 
more than lip service to the importance of considering the aboriginal perspective 
precisely because the majority opinion decontextualizes the aboriginal practices from 
their normative setting. This is evident in the way that the majority describes its task:
The Court’s task in evaluating a claim for an aboriginal right is to 
examine the pre-sovereignty aboriginal practice and translate that 
practice, as faithfully and objectively as it can, into a modem legal 
right. The question is whether the aboriginal practice at the time of 
assertion of European sovereignty... translates into a modem legal 
right, and if so, what right? This exercise involves both aboriginal 
and European perspectives. The Court must consider the pre­
sovereignty practice from the perspective of the aboriginal people.
But in translating it to a common law right, the Court must also 
consider the European perspective; the nature of the right at common 
law must be examined to determine whether a particular aboriginal 
practice fits it. This exercise in translating aboriginal practices to 
modem rights must not be conducted in a formalistic or narrow way.
The Court should take a generous view of the aboriginal practice and 
should not insist on exact conformity to the precise legal parameters 
of the common law right. The question is whether the practice 
corresponds to the core concepts of the legal right claimed.35
By focusing on aboriginal practices and yet at the same time failing to inquire 
into the normative context of that practice, the majority opinion denies the indigenous 
society and culture any opportunity to influence the translation process that the court 
describes. Translation becomes a one way street in which, despite protestations to the 
contrary,36 aboriginal practices are forced into existing common law categories and 
reconciliation is little more than a judicial conclusion or label for the process and its 
outcome, rather than a balancing of views or a rapprochement.37 Thus, for the majority, 
taking the aboriginal perspective seriously seems to mean little more than this: that in the 
event of doubt as to which category of common law right best matches the aboriginal 
practice, the Court will give the benefit of the doubt to the aboriginal practice. Quite 
what this might mean in any particular case is far from clear but it does seem as though a 
“generous view” will not shift the burden of proof onto the Crown38 and will not permit
35 Marshall and Bernard, supra note 1 at para 48.
36 See for example, ibid. at para. 49 to the effect that “[t]o determine aboriginal entitlement one looks to 
aboriginal practices rather than imposing a European template”; see also paras. 48 and 50.
37 See the summary offered ibid. at para. 51 where the majority opinion suggests that the process o f 
examination of the aboriginal practice and translation into a modem right “reconciles the aboriginal and 
European perspectives”.
38 For example, one might imagine a more generous approach in which proof o f  the territorial ambit o f 
indigenous property laws could be taken as proof o f  exclusive use and therefore aboriginal title unless the 
Crown could establish that the content o f  such laws was necessarily more limited.
a “pre-sovereignty aboriginal practice” to “be transformed into a different modem 
right.”39
The majority opinion offers further guidance as to how the aboriginal 
perspective might be operationalized when the court considers three specific issues that 
“evoked particular discussion”, the first of which is the concept of exclusion.40 Having 
concluded that the concept o f exclusion is part of the core common law or European idea 
of title (not apparently because that has been proven before the court but because it can 
just be “assumed by dint o f law”41), how might an indigenous society establish such 
exclusive use? The majority admits that this poses some challenges:
Determining whether it was present in a pre-sovereignty aboriginal 
society, however, can pose difficulties. Often, no right to exclude 
arises by convention or law. So one must look to evidence. But 
evidence may be hard to find. The area may have been sparsely 
populated, with the result that clashes and the need to exclude 
strangers seldom if ever occurred. Or the people may have been 
peaceful and have chosen to exercise their control by sharing rather 
than exclusion. It is therefore critical to view the question of 
exclusion from the aboriginal perspective. To insist on evidence of 
overt acts of exclusion in such circumstances may, depending on the 
circumstances, be unfair. The problem is compounded by the 
difficulty of producing evidence of what happened hundreds of years 
ago where no tradition of written history exists.
It follows that evidence of acts of exclusion is not required to 
establish aboriginal title. All that is required is demonstration of 
effective control of the land by the group, from which a reasonable 
inference can be drawn that it could have excluded others had it 
chosen to do so. The fact that history, insofar as it can be ascertained, 
discloses no adverse claimants may support this inference.42
What seems remarkable about this passage is that the only reference to law 
occurs in the second sentence where the court states, somewhat ambiguously that 
“[o]ften, no right to exclude arises by convention or law.” What did the majority mean 
by this? Did they offer this as a general observation on the property laws of indigenous 
societies in much the same way as Chief Justice Lamer articulated the concept of
39 Ibid. at paras. 50 and 77.
40 Ibid. at paras. 63 et seq.
41 Ibid. at para. 64. I cannot read this phrase without recalling the “because it makes sense” comment o f  
Chief Justice Lamer in Delgamuukw in the context o f  settler sovereignty being the critical date for 
establishing title and John Borrows’ devastating critique o f  that assumption in “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An 
Analysis o f  Delgamuukw v. British Columbia” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 537.
42 Ibid. at paras. 64-65.
implied limitations on aboriginal title in Delgamuukwl Did they mean that counsel led 
no evidence as to the content of Mi’kmaq property laws in this case? Did they mean that 
the accused proved the existence of these laws, but failed to prove that the right to 
exclude formed part of the content of those laws?
Whatever interpretation one puts on this phrase, it does seem clear that if the 
aboriginal society cannot rely on the content and territorial application of its customary 
laws as a basis for title it will have a hard time satisfying the court, outside an area of 
intensive and permanent settlement, of its exclusive possession and therefore of title. 
While the majority acknowledges that it would be unfair to insist upon overt acts of 
exclusion, it still requires the “demonstration of effective control of the land ... from 
which a reasonable inference can be drawn that it could have excluded others had it 
chosen to do so.” And this demonstration of effective control must relate to “definite 
tracts of land” 43 -  a task which is likely to impose a huge evidentiary burden on First 
Nations and other aboriginal peoples whether proceeding as plaintiffs in an action 
commenced by statement of claim or as the accused in a criminal or quasi-criminal case.
Sui generis
The majority’s proposed translation process and the apparent rejection of the sui generis 
approach to aboriginal title further limits the role of the aboriginal perspective. 
Beginning with Justice Dickson’s judgment in Guerin,44 but drawing also on earlier 
decisions of the Privy Council,45 the Supreme Court has, for the last twenty years or 
more, emphasised that various concepts in aboriginal law are sui generis.46 The 
rationale for the sui generis approach lies in part in the different cultural context of 
aboriginal law and common law and the concern that efforts to explain and confine 
concepts of aboriginal law exclusively within the conceptual terminology of the common 
law will likely result in the non-recognition of the interests of aboriginal people. Chief 
Justice Lamer reaffirmed the central importance of the sui generis approach in 
Delgamuukw when he said:
Aboriginal title has been described as sui generis in order to 
distinguish it from “normal” proprietary interests, such as fee simple.
However, as I will now develop, it is also sui generis in the sense that 
its characteristics cannot be completely explained by reference either 
to the common law rules of real property or to the rules of property 
found in aboriginal legal systems. As with other aboriginal rights, it
43 Ibid. at para. 70. And what is a definite tract o f  land? A tract defined in accordance with aboriginal use o f  
the land, or in accordance with the metes and bound descriptions that one sees in the numbered treaties, or in 
accordance with modem surveying conventions?
44 Guerin v. The Queen, [ 1984] 2 S.C.R. 335. See also St. M ary’s Indian Band v. Cranbrook (City), [ 1997] 2 
S.C.R. 657.
45 Amodu Tijani v. Southern Nigeria (Secretary), [1921] 2 A.C. 399.
46 For treaties see R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 at para. 42.
must be understood by reference to both common law and aboriginal 
perspectives.
The idea that aboriginal title is sui generis is the unifying principle 
underlying the various dimensions of that title.47
The sui generis approach is not without its difficulties. It may, for example, 
afford a court more discretion in enforcing an aboriginal entitlement than might be 
available if the court were considering a cause of action based upon a traditional 
common law property right and cause of action. But that is no reason for rejecting the 
doctrine. The Marshall and Bernard majority seems to have rejected the sui generis 
approach to aboriginal title without even announcing that it was doing so, and certainly 
without providing any convincing rationale. How else can we explain that the majority 
judgment never once uses the language of sui generis but speaks instead of translating 
“facts found and thus interpreted into a modem common law right”?48
What then are the implications o f rejecting, or at least not applying, a sui 
generis approach? I think that we can best understand this by asking about the 
translation metaphor and methodology that the court has apparently endorsed in 
determining whether an aboriginal people may be able to establish the existence of an 
aboriginal title. A key part of the court’s methodology is the idea that before an 
indigenous people may lay claim to a property concept known to the common law, they 
must first be able to point to an existing property rights category of the common law and 
then establish that the claimed entitlement and the existing property rights category of 
the common law have a common core content.
Presumably, just as the Van der Peet test for establishing an aboriginal right 
contemplates that the claimant will be free to attempt to characterize the practice in 
question in order to bring it within the protection of s. 35, so also will a claimant be free 
to try to characterize both the analogous settler society property concept and the core 
content of the settler society right. But at the end of the day, in each case, the court will 
have the final say.49 The selection of both the analogous common law concept and the 
core content of that concept will be a value-laden, subjective and normative exercise,50 
as is evident in examining the example of title and asking what might be the (alternative 
or supplementary) core contents of a common law or settler title. One might expect 
there to be broad51 consensus on the proposition that the right to exclude is part of the
47 Delgamuukw, supra note 7 at paras. 112-13.
48 Marshall and Bernard, supra note 1 at para. 69.
49 R. v. Pamajewon and Jones, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821.
50 The majority in Marshall and Bernard, supra note 1 at paras. 48, 51 (“the process determines the nature 
and extent o f  the modem right”) and 69 (“translate facts ... into a modem common law right”) wishes to 
emphasise that the translation process may be an objective one or should at least be as objective as possible; 
but Hume taught us a long time ago that we can never derive an “ought” from an “is” as a matter o f  logic.
51 Broad, but perhaps not universal for property and title have been and always will be essentially contested 
concepts. See in particular C.B. Macpherson’s concluding essay in his Property: Mainstream and Critical
core content of a common law or settler title but that would hardly exhaust the 
possibilities. Other possible aspects of core content which might have important 
implications for the recognition or translation of an aboriginal title include the idea that 
title in the common law is a relative rather than an absolute notion. Common law 
approaches to title never required a plaintiff to establish an absolute title, merely a 
stronger claim than that of the defendant. Emphasis on the relativity of title might have 
served in this case to support the watershed approach to title that had obtained the 
support of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal.52 Similarly, the idea that actual 
exclusive occupation by the title owner is not required either to prove or maintain title 
might be equally core to the concept of fee simple or other title. Indeed it is crystal clear 
that Anglo-Canadian law permits a person to own land and maintain an action in 
trespass vindicating their right of possession even if that person has never set foot on 
that land. Furthermore, the non-occupying titleholder will lose their title only in extreme 
cases through the operation of the doctrine of adverse possession. Emphasis on this 
approach to the core content of title in the present case might have required a more 
detailed interrogation of the contents of indigenous property laws.
We might also think about how a sui generis approach and an aboriginal 
perspective might influence the burden of proof in questions of aboriginal title. I 
commented at the outset that I want my students to read the opening statement of 
counsel in Delgamuukw because I want them to reflect on who has to prove what and in 
what forum. One way to think about this is to ask what evidentiary presumptions should 
flow from Judson’s observations in Calder to the effect that when the settlers came to 
this continent they found a territory “organized in societies” -  not just a territory that 
was occupied (a fact) but a territory that was occupied by peoples who governed 
themselves in accordance with laws. Might it not follow from this that once a First 
Nation or other aboriginal community establishes the ambit of its traditional territory, its 
relationships with its neighbours, and that it had a system of property laws in relation to 
its territory, then the onus should shift to the Crown to show why the First Nation’s 
entitlement as a result of engaging the translation process should be something less than
Positions (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1978) for a vastly different core content o f  the ideal o f  
settler property law.
52 And see also McLachlin C.J.C.’s summary o f  the trial’s judge’s assessment o f  the evidence at para. 79, 
where she refers to the trial judge as concluding that there were not enough M i’kmaq to make sufficiently 
intensive use of inland areas. But sufficient for what? My colleague, Jonnette Watson Hamilton, who 
focused my attention on this paragraph, also notes, based on John G. Reid et. al., The “Conquest” o f  Acadia, 
1710: Imperial, Colonial, and Aboriginal Constructions (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 2004) that at 
the relevant time the majority o f  the population was aboriginal and that the British and Acadians rarely 
moved from their small coastal communities to venture into Mi’kmaq territory. So, who had (more) effective 
control over these areas -  the M i’kmaq, the Acadians, or the British? The tiny British garrison was hardly in 
a position to establish effective control but neither it seems, according to Justice McLachlin, were the 
M i’kmaq, simply because there were not enough o f  them. Putting aside the question o f  losses to disease 
introduced by European settlers and soldiers, the requirement seems to be one o f  an absolute intensity o f  use 
carrying the Lockean implication that absent a certain (European) intensity o f  use, the indigenous people did 
not really need these lands and they could therefore be made available to settlers.
title? Might that not do more justice to an aboriginal perspective and the honour of the 
Crown?
Conclusions
In its Delgamuukw decision the Supreme Court sketched out in the abstract a 
methodology for assessing claims to aboriginal title. The court proposed a vision of an 
aboriginal title with a large or thick content limited only by its inalienability (except to 
the Crown) and the paternalistic imposition of inherent limits on an aboriginal title.53 
Since then the critical outstanding question has been how this methodology would be 
applied in practice. Would it “allow” a First Nation or other aboriginal plaintiff to 
establish an aboriginal title (with such a large and generous content) throughout a 
traditional territory over which it asserted control, or would the recognition of such 
claims, in practice, be confined to permanent community sites? Both seemed plausible 
constructions; the emphasis in Chief Justice Lamer’s opinion on the importance of the 
aboriginal perspective and the corollary implication that an aboriginal plaintiff should be 
able to rely upon aboriginal laws and customs to prove title seemed to offer the prospect 
of establishing broad territorial claims. And certainly this seemed to be Justice Daigle’s 
approach in the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in Bernard. On the other hand Chief 
Justice Lamer had emphasised in Delgamuukw, Adams54 and Côté55 that some claims 
would be better viewed as aboriginal rights claims rather than title claims, especially 
where the intensity of use of particular territory did not support a claim of exclusive 
possession.
The majority opinion in Marshall and Bernard signals that broad territorial 
claims will not likely meet with success but will instead be re-framed or translated as 
more limited claims to aboriginal rights (provided of course that they are also able to 
meet the narrow “aboriginality” test of Van der Peet). The majority pays lip service to 
the importance of taking account of the aboriginal perspective but that perspective is a 
perspective that, in the majority’s opinion, lacks a normative content. Does this mean 
that the majority has closed the door on the possibility of making broader territorial 
claims that go beyond permanent community sites and perhaps intensively used fishing 
locations? I think that this would be too pessimistic a reading of the case and one that 
would ignore the majority’s own emphasis on the nature of the evidence in any 
particular case and its refusal to rule out the possibility that nomadic peoples could 
establish a title claim.56 But proving broad territorial title will clearly be an uphill battle 
in which the weapons of categorization and classification will be wielded to advantage 
by the legal system of the settler society.
53 Delgamuukw, supra note 7 at paras. 128-30.
54 R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101.
55 R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139.
56 Marshall and Bernard, supra note 1 especially at paras. 66 and 70.
Finally, what of the charge, hinted at by the minority opinion, that the 
majority’s approach runs the risk of re-inventing a version of the terra or res nullius 
doctrine? Perhaps one way to answer this question is to ask what vision of the 
geography of property is implicitly endorsed by the majority’s opinion? What would a 
map of this geography look like?57 And how would that geography explain rights 
claims? What would be the jurisdictional basis (territory? citizenship?) of those rights 
claims?58 Full answers to these questions would take us far beyond the scope of this 
comment but perhaps I can give my impression of that map. The map would show a few 
community sites and perhaps particularly valued and intensively used fishing sites 
marked in a solid colour, perhaps green, to represent lands that remained “owned” by the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada when the Crown, by some magic of the common law, 
acquired sovereignty.59 The rest would be vast areas of white (rapidly becoming red or 
pink) that became, at one and the same time as the Crown acquired sovereignty, the 
waste lands of the Crown (because after all the common law abhors a vacuum when it 
comes to ownership). This is a map that looks to me suspiciously like a map of terra 
nullius, with just a few limited exceptions, and it is a vision that would have appealed to 
the likes of the Reserve Commissioners and the McKenna McBride Commissioners in 
British Columbia and perhaps even to Joseph Trutch, the former Commissioner of Lands 
for the colony and that province’s first Lieutenant Governor.60
Perhaps I will have to fundamentally change the way in which I teach the law 
of aboriginal title in light of Marshall and Bernard and perhaps at the same time I will 
also have to change my understanding of the St. Catherine’s Milling Case,61 a case that I 
want to say stands, inter alia, for the proposition that unless and until the Crown 
acquires title from the aboriginal occupants of the land by treaty (i.e. Treaty 3 in the case 
of St. Catherine’s) or by some other lawful means (e.g. pre-1982 extinguishment 
legislation that was sufficiently specific and passed by a competent government), the 
lands and the revenues associated with those lands and resources are not available to the
57 On the geography o f  property see Cole Harris’ marvellous, Making Native Space (Vancouver: University o f  
British Columbia Press, 2002).
58 Is the right to harvest in a particular location just a “fact” or does it depend, as I would argue, on a 
customary legal system? And if  the latter, what is the territorial ambit o f  that legal system?
59 See Haida Nation, supra note 34 at para. 32 and discussing Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911.
60 For details see Hamar Foster, “Letting Go the Bone: The Idea o f  Indian Title in British Columbia, 1849- 
1927” in Hamar Foster and John McLaren, eds., British Columbia and the Yukon: Essays in the History o f  
Canadian Law, Vol. VI (Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal 
History, 1995) at 28 and Paul Tennant, Aboriginal People and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British 
Columbia, 1849-1989 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990).
61 St. Catherine’s Milling Co. v. R. (1888), 14 A.C. 46, a decision that was strongly reaffirmed in 
Delgamuukw, along with the Privy Council’s reading o f the “interest other than that o f  the province” 
language o f  s.109 o f  the Constitution Act, 1867.
Crown in right of the province for the benefit of the consolidated revenue fund of the 
province.62 Clearly, I have much re-thinking to do if I am to reconcile Marshall and 
Bernard’s vision and understanding of aboriginal title with the kind of reconciliation 
that seemed possible after Delgamuukw.
621 derive some comfort from the even more recent decision o f the full court in Mikisew Cree First Nation v. 
Canada (Minister o f  Canadian Heritage) 2005 SCC 69 where the court breathed new life into the “lands 
taken up” provisions o f  the Numbered Treaties covering much o f  what is now the prairie provinces. The 
unanimous opinion in Mikisew Cree was authored, like the majority judgment in Marshall No. 1 [1999] 3 
SCR 456, by Binnie J. It seems to me to be unfortunate that Binnie J. did not sit in Marshall and Bernard, 
leaving the Chief Justice as the only member o f  the Marshall and Bernard court to have also sat in Marshall 
No. 1 (where o f course she dissented). Justice Binnie might have been able to offer a different (and perhaps 
more authoritative) version o f  just what the majority meant in that case when it endorsed the view that the 
negative covenant recorded in the treaty text should be interpreted as affording a right to trade and as further 
implying a right to harvest natural resources to support that trading entitlement. But all o f  this relates to the 
treaty issues and I promised at the outset to confine my comments to one aspect o f  the aboriginal title issues.
